

To: []

From: C]

March 4th, 1950

I attach a brief note which sketches in outline our current thoughts on Valuable operations in the coming season. I would be grateful for your views in due course.

May I add, as a footnote, that my headquarters is extremely anxious to give the Greeks and Italians an answer to the questions that they are insistently pressing on the subject of last year's operations. It is proposed that we should tell them that those operations were intelligence operations, and that we should pass them a summary of the intelligence yield in support of that contention. My headquarters stresses that action in this respect would in no way commit us to bring the Greeks or Italians into the Valuable picture. Our hands would remain as free as they are now. Meanwhile, in the absence of a reply from you, my headquarters is being seriously embarrassed by the Greeks and Italians in other, not unimportant directions. A very early reply would therefore be appreciated.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES/METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2D
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

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In the light of the latest Foreign Office statement, which has been communicated to the State Department, action is open to us under the following heads:

1. Infiltration of agents with intelligence briefs;
2. Propaganda designed to keep alive the spirit of resistance and to accustom resistance elements to look to the Committee for leadership;
3. Clandestine operations designed to weaken Albanian economy.

Infiltration of agents.

The scale of British operations has not yet been determined, but it will certainly be smaller than originally envisaged. It seems doubtful whether as many as twelve parties will be launched in the course of the year.

We propose to start with the four parties which operated in Albania last year. It is intended that these parties should be transferred to Greece shortly before the opening of the operational season; and that, on the first suitable occasion, they should be launched over the land frontier into Southern Albania.

Our reasons for suggesting this course of action are as follows:

1. The men in question are natives of Southern Albania.
2. They already have experience of clandestine activity in Southern Albania.
3. Malta is no longer available as a base for clandestine operations.
4. Infiltration by land is simpler and less costly than infiltration by sea or air.
5. We expect the Greeks to give us facilities in respect of Albania similar to those they already give us in respect of Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, i.e. holding camps, guards, travel facilities, etc.
6. Although seeking Greek help entails a security risk, it is no greater than the risk already accepted in respect of Bulgaria and Yugoslavia.
7. It is considered unlikely that the Greeks will claim a voice in the conduct of operations, though they may well try to seduce individual agents.

The infiltration of the first four parties will be followed by the infiltration of other parties, on a scale to be determined by the course of events (and by the restrictions imposed by the Foreign Office). The recruitment of these other parties will be effected through the Committee.

To put these proposals into effect, it will be necessary at an early date to tell the Greeks (probably General Papagos) what we propose to do, and to obtain from them the required facilities. We would therefore be grateful for your early agreement to our proposed course of action.

It should be stressed that these operations being mounted from Greece will be intelligence operations, and that, in approaching the Greeks, we would make no mention of the wider aims of Valuable.

Meanwhile, we would be grateful for a statement of what you have accomplished hitherto, and what you plan to do for the future. I need hardly say that, though geographical considerations may impose on us approaches to the problem of Albania from different points of the compass, it remains our earnest wish to preserve the joint nature of our enterprise. We therefore propose to keep you closely informed of our plans and their execution, and to take no step without full consultation. I would be grateful for an assurance that this also represents your attitude.

Propaganda.

As you are aware, our experts are extremely sceptical of the probable value of the radio ship; and we decided accordingly that the project was worth neither expense nor risk. In view of the contrary opinion expressed by your experts, I would be grateful to know whether you propose to persevere with the project, and, if so, in what direction.

Apart from the radio ship, the main clandestine propaganda agency will be leaflet distribution. We contemplate distribution by direct air-drop and by means of balloons. (The problem of releasing balloons from ships is being studied in London.) It is possible that the Foreign Office would raise no objection to the distribution of leaflets by agent means; I am seeking further guidance on this point.

The machinery at present available for writing, vetting, printing and distributing leaflets is cumbersome in the extreme, and entails inordinate delay. It is suggested that greater efficiency would be achieved by the establishment of a small, regular Propaganda Executive Centre, which would concern itself not only with the production of leaflets, but also with pushing the interests of the Committee vis-a-vis overt news distribution agencies, e.g. BBC, VOA, the leading press agencies, etc.

In our view, the best location for such a Propaganda Executive Centre would be London. The reasons dictating its choice in preference to Rome or Athens are as follows:

1. Greater security.
2. Less risk of political taint.
3. Speedy communications with Washington and the field commanders.
4. Proximity to distributing agencies.

At Appendix "A" I attach a suggested lay-out for the Propaganda Executive Centre, which illustrates the various channels open to it for the intake and output of material.

In addition, it is suggested that the Committee should be made primarily responsible for the provision and preparation of the subject-matter for our propaganda to Albania. In this, they would doubtless require stimulus and discreet guidance from our representatives in Rome.

With regard to the printing, it is understood that you originally undertook to instal multilith presses in Athens (at a time when Athens was envisaged as the location of the Propaganda Centre). You will see from the Appendix that it is now suggested that this equipment should be installed in London instead.

It is already agreed that we should exchange views on the main themes to be exploited in our propaganda to Albania.

Economic Action.

Preliminary study of this problem suggests that the scope for effective action is severely restricted. So far, two possibilities have suggested themselves:

1. The Italians should be induced to discontinue the purchase of Albanian oil. An alternative source of supply would have to be provided. I understand that the quantity involved is extremely small, and that such a step would not seriously embarrass the Albanian Government.
2. Supplies from the satellite countries might be obstructed in Trieste. This suggestion presents complex legal difficulties; it also runs counter to our policy of building up the prosperity of Trieste.

Our Attitude towards the Committee.

Our attitude towards the Committee is governed by two limiting factors:

1. The goodwill of the Committee is necessary to us (a) because it is the instrument with which we hope ultimately to influence the course of events in Albania, and (b) because it controls the flow of recruits.
2. We can repose no confidence in the discretion of individual members of the Committee, and we cannot therefore give the Committee detailed information regarding our plans.

Factor (1) excludes the possibility of cold-shouldering the Committee; factor (2) imposes caution.

It is suggested therefore that the Committee should be told of the general scope of our plans in respect of infiltration and propaganda. The

information given should be sufficient to show them the size of the recruiting problem and our requirements in respect of propaganda material. On the other hand, it should not reveal to them the details of our operational plans (time and place of operations, etc.), nor the methods of propaganda distribution, e.g. air-drop, balloons, etc. In the likely event of the Committee expressing disappointment at the limited scope of this year's operations, it is suggested that stress be laid on technical factors. In no case should the Committee be told that we are soft-peddling for political reasons.

With regard to the military question, our attitude may be stated as follows:

We never did like the idea of re-opening the military question and, had we not been confronted with a fait accompli, we would not have agreed to it being re-opened. Nevertheless, we feel that we are now committed to discussion provided any member of the Committee presses the issue, and that we have more to lose than to gain by absenting ourselves from the discussions. There is no knowing what the Albanians will evolve if left to themselves (vide the memorandum recently submitted by Muharrem Bajraktar), but, if our representatives exert their influence, we may be able to preserve a proper perspective.

We have no objection to Dosti's suggestion that Abas Kupa should become Chief of Staff (we presume he means in effect C-in-C) provided that Dosti can overcome the opposition which we feel will certainly manifest itself. We regard the goodwill of Abas Ermenjo as particularly important.

Appendix "A"

PROPAGANDA ORGANIZATION

LONDON

WASHINGTON

Propaganda Executive Centre

F.O.
(Note 1)

British

American

O.P.C.
(Note 4)

1 British Editor
1 Albanian Advisor
1 Clerk

1 U.S. Editor
2 Multilith Press
Operators
1 Clerk

(Note 2)

(Note 3)

ROME
SIS Rep. Rome
(Note 5)

BBC

British
Distribution
Agency
(Note 6)

VOA

OPC
Rep.
ROME
(Note 5)

American
Distribution
Agency
(Note 7)

Free Albanian
Committee

Note 1. Any propaganda material to be cleared on British side with F.O.

Note 2. To be found from existing SIS staff.

Note 3. To be found from OPC resources and presumably accommodated in U.S. Embassy together with the multilith press.

Notes 2 and 3.

These staffs form Propaganda Executive. They collect draft pamphlets from ROME (see Note 5) and submit them to WASHINGTON and FOA (see Notes 4 and 1) for clearance. They print pamphlets and issue to either British or American distribution agency (see Notes 6 and 7). They also produce any suitable material for overt broadcast and pass to BBC and VOA for broadcasting.

Note 4. OPC to decide whether they want material cleared with WASHINGTON. Communication would presumably be through Ruddock/OPC channel.

Note 5. SIS and OPC Representatives ROME would collect material from Committee, pass on any special instructions from P.E.C., and goad Committee into activity.

Note 6. Aircraft and balloons from ships are suggested methods. (Albanians NOT to be told how we propose distributing pamphlets.)

Note 7. Presumed to U.S.A.A.F. in Germany.